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Abstract
Recently a new impulse has been given to the experimental investigation of contextuality. In this paper we show
that for a widely used definition of contextuality there can be no decisive experiment on the existence of contextuality.
To this end, we give a clear presentation of the hidden variable models due to Meyer, Kent and Clifton (MKC), which
would supposedly nullify the Kochen-Specker Theorem. Although we disagree with this last statement, the models
play a significant role in the discussion on the meaning of contextuality. In fact, we introduce a specific MKC-model
of which we show that it is non-contextual and completely in agreement with quantum mechanical predictions. We
also investigate the possibility of other definitions of non-contextuality –with an emphasis on operational definitions–
and argue that any useful definition relies on the specification of a theoretical framework. It is therefore concluded
that no experimental test can yield any conclusions about contextuality on a metaphysical level.
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1 Introduction
It is the general consensus that the Kochen-Specker Theo-
rem excludes the existence of non-contextual hidden vari-
able theories. Naturally this leads to the questions of what
is really meant by the notion of contextuality, what the
implications are for the future of hidden variable theories,
and if experimental proof of this statement is possible.
Over the past ten years the discussion on these questions
has had an enormous boost but, surprisingly, with mutu-
ally opposing outcomes results. On the one hand Meyer,
Kent, Clifton and Barrett [5], [18], [23], [31] have advo-
cated the view that non-contextual hidden variable models
can be constructed that reproduce the quantum mechani-
cal predictions. On the other hand there have been exper-
iments that claim to prove that nature is contextual, in
accordance with quantum mechanical predictions [6], [19],
[22], [24], [28], [32], [33], [34], [39]. Thus far, no serious
attempt has been made to clarify the paradox at hand.
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That is, until now.
In section 2 of this paper we give a clear presentation
of the non-contextual hidden variable models proposed by
Meyer, Kent and Clifton. These models turn out to be
very flexible and we introduce one that is completely em-
pirically equivalent with quantum mechanics. Our hope
is that we will remove a lot of the misconceptions about
these models, which have led to objections against these
models, cf. [5], [20]. In this paper these models will play
a leading role in the investigation of several notions of
non-contextuality and the possibility of experimental tests
thereof.
In section 3 we study the operational definitions of
non-contextuality as proposed in [38] and how the MKC-
models behave with respect to these definitions. We will
argue that whether or not the MKC-models are contextual
with respect to these definitions relies on the precise in-
terpretations of these definitions. This demonstrates that
operational non-contextuality is rather ambiguously de-
fined.
In section 4 we will shed a light on what is actually
shown in several proposed and conducted tests of con-
textuality. It will be shown that the tests of common
notions of contextuality depend on auxiliary assumptions
that aren’t satisfied by the MKC-models. In section 4.4 it
is shown that the experimental tests of operational non-
contextuality rely on an interpretation of the definition
of non-contextuality for which even classical physics turns
out to be contextual. This is taken as a strengthening of
our opinion that these definitions are ambiguous. Finally,
we take a more general viewpoint on the idea of exper-
imental tests of contextuality and argue that there can
be no notion of contextuality that is both metaphysically
interesting and experimentally accessible.
2 The MKC-models as a non-
contextual hidden variable the-
ory
2.1 The Kochen-Specker Theorem
The models of Meyer, Kent and Clifton (MKC, [18], [23],
[31]) are constructed around the Kochen-Specker Theo-
rem [26]. Therefore, a clear description of this theorem is
mandatory for a good understanding of the models. We
present it here as a purely mathematical result so as to
keep the philosophical and the mathematical discussions
as much separated as possible.
Theorem 2.1 (Kochen & Specker 1967) Let H be a
Hilbert space and let Bsa(H) denote the set of self-adjoint
operators on this space with domain dense in H. Then,
if dim(H) > 2, there exists no function λ : Bsa(H) → R
such that
1. for every A ∈ Bsa(H): λ(A) lies in the spectrum of
A;
σ(A) = {x ∈ R ; A− x 1l not invertible}, (1)
2. for every Borel function f : λ(f(A)) = f(λ(A)) ∀A ∈
Bsa(H).
The connection of this theorem to physics stems from
the fact that it can be used to prove that the following
four statements cannot all be jointly true:
QM (Quantum Mechanics) Every observable A can be
associated with a self-adjoint operator A on some
Hilbert space H. The result of a measurement of A is
an element of the spectrum σ(A) of A. Observables
whose corresponding operators commute can be mea-
sured simultaneously. Moreover, if there is a func-
tional relationship between the associated operators,
this relation is preserved in the measurement results.
Re (Realism) Every observable A possesses a certain
value λ(A) ∈ R at all times.
FM (Faithful Measurement) A measurement of an observ-
able A at a certain time reveals the value λ(A) pos-
sessed by that observable at that time.
CP (Correspondence Principle) There is a bijective cor-
respondence between observables and self-adjoint op-
erators.
Indeed, Re and CP together imply the existence of a
function λ : Bsa(H)→ R and FM and QM together imply
that this function should satisfy 1 and 2. The Kochen-
Specker Theorem can therefore be formulated in the fol-
lowing way:
QM ∧ Re ∧ FM ∧ CP→ ⊥ (2)
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Consequently, one is forced to give up at least one of these
assumptions. QM states a part of quantum mechanics
that is partly empirically testable and which seems hard
to abandon in any theory that wishes to reproduce the
experimental predictions of quantum mechanics. On the
other hand, the conjunction of Re with FM is often seen
as one of the great shortcomings not satisfied in orthodox
quantum mechanics. Therefore, in any realist interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, endorsing Re and FM, one is
likely to give up CP, which is the standard solution in all
feasible hidden variable theories. Traditionally, it is taken
that the negation of CP is likely to introduce contextual-
ity; the idea that observables are not completely defined
by their associated operator but only by also specifying
the entire measuring context in which the observable is
being measured. For example, Redhead stated that
“we might respond by [. . . ] rejecting Corr [CP
in our text]. In other words, we now suppose
that there are many different observables, corre-
sponding in general to some particular operator
A.” [36, p. 134]
We formulate non-contextuality in the following way:
NC (Non-Contextuality) Every observable is uniquely de-
fined by a self-adjoint operator.
which has a clear meaning in the present context, and
avoids the notion of a measurement context. Although this
notion may sound technical it is strongly related to more
common definitions of contextuality that are formulated
using triplets of self-adjoint operators A,B,C such that
[A,B] = [A,C] = 0 but [B,C] 6= 0. Then, a hidden vari-
able theory is called non-contextual if for all such triplets
the value assigned to A does not depend on whether A will
be measured together B or with C. From our NC it fol-
lows that there is only one observable corresponding to A
and therefore (by Re and FM) only one value assigned to
this observable and operator. Thus the more common no-
tion of non-contextuality follows from our NC with the aid
of Re and FM. Strictly, the converse doesn’t follow (mak-
ing NC more restricting) since for NC it doesn’t matter
whether or not B and C commute, while for the common
notion nothing is being said about the situation where
[B,C] = 0, but we will not make a fuzz about this detail.
However, another option for a hidden variable theory to
violate CP is to not let every self-adjoint operator corre-
spond to an observable. Indeed, CP is the conjunction of
NC together with
IP (Identification Principle) Every self-adjoint operator
represents an observable.
Mathematically, one can look at these assumptions in the
following way. If Obs denotes the set of observables, then
QM states that there exists a function f : Obs → Bsa(H),
NC states that this function is injective, and IP that this
function is surjective. The question then arises if it is actu-
ally possible to construct a hidden variable theory that is
empirically equivalent with quantum mechanics, and sat-
isfies Re, FM and NC, i.e. if rejecting IP is sufficient to
construct a non-contextual hidden variable theory. We
will show that this is possible by constructing such a the-
ory.
2.2 The finite-precision argument
The idea that not all self-adjoint operators represent ob-
servables is not new (e.g. [41]). However, common proofs
of the Kochen-Specker Theorem only assume a weakened
version of IP; only a finite set of self-adjoint operators is
selected for which it is assumed that they correspond to
observables. Therefore, it is our task to motivate why not
all of these operators that appear in any of these proofs
should be identified with observables. The motivation will
be well explained in the example of the original Kochen-
Specker proof. In this proof one considers operators de-
noted S2r which are associated with the squared spin of a
spin-1 particle along some axis r ∈ S2, where S2 denotes
the two-dimensional sphere in R3.
To circumvent the Kochen-Specker Theorem, we must
assume that not for every r ∈ S2 the operator S2r can be
associated with an observable. We claim that it is suf-
ficient if for every r ∈ S2 and every ǫ > 0 there exists
an r′ ∈ S2 such that ‖r − r′‖ < ǫ and S2r′ is associated
with an observable. This mathematical requirement is ex-
plained in the following way. Suppose an experimenter
wishes to measure the observable associated with S2r for
some r ∈ S2. Then it may be the case that this observ-
able does not exist in our hidden variable model. For such
objects we introduce the term pseudo observable. The ex-
perimenter may not (and most likely cannot) know that
this observable does not exist, but still can arrange the ex-
perimental setup. However, when he arranges his setup,
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he is only able to align the apparatus along the r-axis
up to a finite precision bounded from below by a certain
ǫ > 0. So instead of measuring the pseudo observable, it is
assumed that the measurement reveals the value of some
actual observable S2r′ associated with the operator S2r′ for
some r′ ∈ S2 with ‖r− r′‖ < ǫ. This is the finite-precision
argument.
More generally, for empirical equivalence with quan-
tum mechanics (up to arbitrary finite precision of mea-
surements) it is sufficient to assume that there exists an
injection i : Obs → Bsa(H) from the set of observables to
the set of self-adjoint operators such that i(Obs) is dense in
Bsa(H) in the sense that ∀A ∈ Bsa(H), ∀ǫ > 0, ∃A′ ∈ Obs
such that ‖i(A′)−A‖ < ǫ, where ‖.‖ denotes the operator
norm.
Since this specifies the setting for the rest of the article,
we will assume further on that Obs is specified as a subset
of Bsa(H), and we will make no distinction in notation
between observables and self-adjoint operators. Also, we
note that the finite-precision argument merely provides an
argument for selecting such a subset as the set of observ-
ables. But as soon as such a subset is constructed one
could drop the argument and take it is an axiom that Obs
describes the set of observables. From this point of view,
the MKC-models aren’t models about the finite precision
of measurement, which we think is a common misconcep-
tion.
2.3 Formulation of the MKC-models
A requirement for a non-contextual hidden variable theory
is that there exist sets of observables such that Obs is dense
in Bsa(H) that are also colorable in the Kochen-Specker
sense (i.e., they satisfy 1. and 2. in Theorem 2.1). We will
also assume that for any observable A and Borel function
f , f(A) is again an observable. We thus aim to construct
sets Obs such that the set of hidden variables
Λ :=
{
λ : Obs → R ; ∀A∈Obs,∀ Borel function f :λ(A)∈σ(A), λ(f(A))=f(λ(A))
}
(3)
is not empty and Obs is dense in Bsa(H). The hidden
variables λ ∈ Λ will also be called colorings of Obs.
That this is possible was proven in detail in [18]. A for-
mulation of this result is mandatory for the construction
and understanding of the non-contextual MKC-models,
but it requires some notations and definitions that we will
formulate first.
For an orthonormal basis 〈ei〉ni=1 we define
P1 (〈ei〉ni=1) := {Pe1 , . . . , Pe2}, (4)
where Pei denotes the projection on the one-dimensional
subspace spanned by ei. Furthermore, let P(〈ei〉ni=1) de-
note the set of all projection operators that can be formed
by making linear combinations of elements of P1(〈ei〉ni=1)
(including the zero operator) and set
A (〈ei〉ni=1) :=
{
n∑
i=1
aiPei ; ai ∈ R∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
, (5)
the Abelian C*-algebra generated by P1 (〈ei〉ni=1).
Now two orthonormal bases 〈ei〉ni=1 and 〈e′i〉ni=1 are
called totally incompatible if for all P ∈ P(〈ei〉ni=1) and
P ′ ∈ P(〈e′i〉ni=1), [P, P ′] = 0 if and only if P ∈ {0, 1l} or
P ′ ∈ {0, 1l}. In other words, P H ⊂ P ′H implies P = 0 or
P ′ = 1l. Equivalently, two orthonormal bases are totally
incompatible iff
A (〈ei〉ni=1) ∩ A (〈e′i〉ni=1) = C 1l . (6)
Theorem 2.2 (Clifton & Kent 2001) For every finite
dimensional Hilbert space there exists a countable set of to-
tally incompatible bases {〈e1,i〉ni=1, 〈e2,i〉ni=1, . . .} such that
Obs :=
∞⋃
k=1
A (〈ek,i〉ni=1) (7)
is dense in Bsa(H).
Colorings of this set are easy to construct. For any
f ∈ {1, . . . , n}N we define λf : Obs → R in the following
way. If A = c 1l, λf (A) := c. For every other A there is
exactly one j ∈ N such that A ∈ A (〈ej,i〉ni=1) and we set
λf (A) = λf
(
n∑
i=1
aiPej,i
)
:= af(j). (8)
It is straight forward to show that this is indeed a coloring
and that each possible coloring of Obs is uniquely defined
by an element of {1, . . . , n}N in this way, i.e. the set of all
colorings (3) is isomorphic to {1, . . . , n}N.1
The obtained set Λ, of hidden variables, is rich enough
to allow the definition of probability measures on it that
obey the Born rule:
1Proofs of these claims may be found in [20, Lemma 3.4].
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Theorem 2.3 For every density operator ρ on the Hilbert
space H, there is a probability measure IPρ on Λ such that
Eρ(A) :=
∫
Λ
λ(A) d IPρ(λ) = Tr(ρA) (9)
for every A ∈ Obs.
Proof:2
In order to prove the existence of the probability measure
IPρ, Λ ≃ {1, . . . , n}N has to be turned into a measurable
space first. For a finite sequence t1, . . . , tk of natural num-
bers (not necessarily in increasing order) and a sequence
B1, . . . , Bk of subsets of {1, . . . , n}, define
S(t1, . . . , tk;B1, . . . , Bk) :=
{λf ∈ Λ ; f(t1) ∈ B1, . . . , f(tk) ∈ Bk}. (10)
For a fixed sequence t1, . . . , tk, let Σ(t1, . . . , tk) be the σ-
algebra generated by all these sets. Further, let Σ be the
smallest σ-algebra that contains all these σ-algebras. Note
that Σ(t1, . . . , tk) has in fact only finite many elements
and that it is isomorphic (as a set) to the power set of
{1, . . . , n}{t1,...,tk}. Therefore, a probability measure on
the space (Λ,Σ(t1, . . . , tk)) is completely defined by its
action on the sets that are equivalent to a singleton subset
of {1, . . . , n}{t1,...,tk}, i.e. the sets of the form
s(t1, . . . , tk; j1, . . . , jk) :=
{λf ∈ Λ ; f(ti) = ji for i = 1, . . . , k}. (11)
Now let a density operator ρ be given. For each finite
sequence t1, . . . , tk define a probability measure IPρ,t1,...,tk
on the space (Λ,Σ(t1, . . . , tk)) by
IPρ,t1,...,tk [s(t1, . . . , tk; j1, . . . , jk)] :=
k∏
i=1
Tr
(
ρPeti,ji
)
,
(12)
for each sequence j1, . . . , jk in {1, . . . , n}.
It is easy to see that these probability measures satisfy
the following consistency criteria:
2This result was assumed to be trivial in [18] and therefore no
proof was given there. However, it is essential for the discussion
and it seems not everyone was convinced that the MKC-models can
in fact reproduce quantum statistics [11], [29]. A more extensive
discussion can be found in [20, §3.3 and §3.5].
1. For any finite sequence t1, . . . , tk and all permutations
(t′1, . . . , t
′
k) = (tpi(1), . . . , tpi(k)) one has
IPρ,t′
1
,...,t′
k
[s(t′1, . . . , t
′
k; jpi(1), . . . , jpi(k))] =
IPρ,t1,...,tk [s(t1, . . . , tk; j1, . . . , jk)]. (13)
2. For each finite sequence t1, . . . , tk, tk+1, the mea-
sure IPρ,t1,...,tk,tk+1 acts as IPρ,t1,...,tk on every set in
Σ(t1, . . . , tk), i.e. IPρ,t1,...,tk,tk+1(S) = IPρ,t1,...,tk(S)
for all S ∈ Σ(t1, . . . , tk).
Then, according to the Kolmogorov’s extension theorem
(see for example Theorem 10.1 in [9]), there exists a prob-
ability measure IPρ on the space (Λ,Σ) such that IPρ acts
as IPρ,t1,...,tk on the sets in Σ(t1, . . . , tk), for each finite
sequence t1, . . . , tk.
The only thing left to show is that IPρ satisfies (9). For
one-dimensional projections this follows almost immedi-
ately:
Eρ(Pem,l ) = IPρ[Pem,l = 1]
= IPρ({λf ∈ Λ ; f(l) = m})
= IPρ,l({λf ∈ Λ ; f(l) = m}) = Tr(ρPem,l ).
(14)
And also for any multiple of the unit operator (9) follows
immediately since
Eρ(c 1l) =
∫
Λ
λ(c 1l) d IPρ(λ) = c
∫
Λ
d IPρ(λ)
= c = Tr(ρc 1l).
(15)
For all the other observables A ∈ Obs, there is exactly one
m ∈ N with A ∈ A (〈em,i〉ni=1). Therefore,
Eρ(A) =
n∑
j=1
ajEρ(Pm,j) =
n∑
j=1
aj Tr(ρPm,j) = Tr(ρA).
(16)
This completes the proof. 
Any hidden variable model that uses this set up may be
called an MKC-model. There are of course still many ways
to complete this to form a complete theory, in the sense
that no interpretation for the hidden variables and the
probability measures has been specified yet, and no time-
evolution of the state of the system has been defined. In
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the next section we propose a specific MKC-model that is
complete in this sense, and for which we claim that it is
completely empirically equivalent to quantum mechanics.
2.4 The Hedgehog Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics
Although Barrett and Kent claimed that the MKC-models
show the existence of non-contextual hidden variable the-
ories [5], they did not bother to proof this explicitly. Over-
more, it was not clear why some of the objections against
these models were incorrect or irrelevant (although they
did make some terrific efforts in this direction). Most no-
ticeably are the objections due to Appleby [1], [2], [3], [4].
He not only objected that no time-evolution for the MKC-
models were specified ever, but also showed why there are
difficulties with respect to this issue. Here, we will show
that these difficulties can be resolved.
The hidden variables in the MKC-models have a seem-
ingly paradoxical character. On one hand, their definition
is motivated by considering the finite precision of mea-
surements, but on the other hand, they have been accused
for being unphysical using finite precision arguments as
well [1], [29]. The reason is that they are likely to assign
totally different values to observables that are very close
to each other in Obs, a result that was proven by Appleby
for the squared spins of a spin-1 particle [4]. Explicitly, he
showed the following:
Theorem 2.4 Let Obs ⊂ Bsa(C3) be a dense colorable
subset and let λ be a coloring of this set. Then there exists
an open set Uλ in the 2-sphere S
2 such that λ restricted to
{S2r ∈ Obs ; r ∈ Uλ} is discontinuous in every point.
At a first glance, this result doesn’t seem to give rise
to any problems. Any coloring is trivially discontinuous
at some points for it can only assign the values 0 and
1 on the set {S2r ∈ Obs}, and both values must be ob-
tained. So any objection based on Theorem 2.4 should
exploit the fact that the discontinuities are dense.3 We
will illustrate a possible objection and construct a specific
MKC-model that circumvents this objection. This model
will be termed the ‘hedgehog interpretation’ of quantum
mechanics.
3This point was already discussed in [5, §3.1]. But no satisfactory
solution was obtained for the objections we will raise.
Consider a spin-1 particle in a non-contextual hidden
variable state λ, and let Uλ be as in Theorem 2.4. Now
suppose one wishes to subsequently measure the (possibly
pseudo) observable S2r for some r ∈ Uλ. Quantum me-
chanics predicts that the result of every measurement will
be the same. However, in the MKC-model this seems un-
likely for there is no reason to assume that the subsequent
measurements are actually measurements of the same ob-
servable; even the slightest variation in the measurement
setting is likely to change the obtained measurement re-
sult.
A first possible solution to this problem, which we do
not find satisfactory, may be to introduce an extra hidden
variable that serves as a memory of which measurements
have been performed on the system. The actual observable
then being measured depends both on the setting of the
measurement apparatus and the previous obtained mea-
surement results. Although conspirational, this scheme
may seem to work as long as the actual observable being
measured lies within the finite precision range of the ob-
servable that was intended to be measured. However, the
notion of ‘finite precision range’ is not well-defined and an
experimenter may set out to ‘trick nature’ in this scheme.
Indeed, the experimenter may not be setting out to subse-
quently measure the same observable, but to subsequently
measure different observables within some small neighbor-
hood. The system thus would have to know if the small
derivations in the setting of the measurement apparatus
are due to the limited precision of measurement, or that
they are intentional. A scheme that is too conspirational
for this author.
Instead, we adopt an easier solution to the problem by
actually copying the solution von Neumann already intro-
duced for quantum mechanics [40, Ch. III, §3]. Indeed,
if one assumes that the measurement changes the state λ
into the state λ′ –where λ′ is randomly selected according
to the measure IPρ′ and ρ′ is the projected quantum me-
chanical state– subsequent measurements are completely
in accordance with quantum mechanical predictions. But
there’s no reason to stop here. It is also desirable that the
evolution of the hidden variable state is in accordance with
all the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics and
thus the unitary evolution of the quantum state should
also be incorporated in the model . It then seems natu-
ral to describe the evolution of the hidden variable state
λ(t) as a stochastic process such that for every t ∈ R and
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measurable set ∆ ⊂ Λ one has
IP[λ(t) ∈ ∆] = IPρ(t)(∆), (17)
where the evolution of ρ(t) is given by the postulates of
quantum mechanics (including the projection postulate).
The MKC-model specified above presents itself as an
interpretation of orthodox quantum mechanics, where all
observables have a non-contextual value at all times. The
set of observables in this interpretation coincides with a
‘spiked’ subset of the set of all self-adjoint operators, hence
the term ‘hedgehog interpretation’. By construction it
is empirically indistinguishable from quantum mechanics
and therefore proves the existence of a non-contextual hid-
den variable theory. In other words, although
QM ∧ Re ∧ FM ∧NC ∧ IP→ ⊥ (18)
is true, giving up either NC or IP is sufficient to prevent
a contradiction, and explicit models that show this can
be constructed (as we have shown here for only giving
up IP). One may note that from this point of view, the
Kochen-Specker Theorem is not nullified by the finite pre-
cision argument (motivating the rejection of IP) any more
than it already was by Bell’s Bohrian insight in [7] where
he argued that certain demands (like NC) “are seen to be
quite unreasonable when one remembers with Bohr ‘the
impossibility of any sharp distinction between the behav-
ior of atomic objects and the interaction with the measur-
ing instruments which serve to define the conditions under
which the phenomena appear.’ [10, p. 210]”.4
One may of course argue that a hidden variable theory
should at least solve the measurement problem, and that
a hidden variable theory with a projection postulate is not
a hidden variable theory at all. We however believe that
the problem of realism (in the sense of Re) and the mea-
surement problem may be independent and should thus
be treated independently, i.e. the measurement problem
is not part of the present discussion. There is however
4Historically, somewhere something must have went wrong with
the interpretation of the Kochen-Specker Theorem when the con-
sensus became that Bell’s argument against the original theorem (a
variation of (2)) was the only possible argument against it, i.e. that
giving up NC is the only way to violate CP. So although the the-
orem has now become famous as the proof of the impossibility of
non-contextuality (which it doesn’t prove), it originally wasn’t set
up to prove this but merely to show that a hidden variable model
for quantum mechanics that satisfies certain seemingly plausible re-
quirements cannot be constructed (which it does prove).
still the question whether a satisfactory MKC-model may
exist that circumvents the use of the projection postulate,
for example, in the form of a spontaneous collapse theory.
Indeed, the MKC-models show a lot of flexibility when
it comes to possible time-evolutions, and it is not unlikely
that they can also serve as explicit toy models in the inves-
tigation of other problems in the foundations of quantum
mechanics. For example, the models are flexible enough to
allow versions that violate the so-called Tsirelson bound
for the CHSH-inequality [16], [17].5 In the remainder of
this paper, we will use them to improve the discussion on
the possibility of experimental tests for contextuality.
3 Operational definitions of con-
textuality
3.1 Introduction
Thus far we have mainly focused on one notion of contex-
tuality and one may argue that this isn’t general enough
for the present discussion. In [38], Spekkens proposed a
generalization that, allegedly, applies to all operational
theories, arbitrary experimental procedures and a broad
class of ontological models of quantum theory, namely:
“A noncontextual ontological model of an oper-
ational theory is one wherein if two experimen-
tal procedures are operationally equivalent, then
they have equivalent representations in the onto-
logical model.” [38]
5A maximal violation of the inequality can easily be achieved for
a pair of spin-1 particles by introducing a specific time-evolution.
First, consider for one particle the operator Qr = 2Sr−1l and let ψr
denote its eigenstate for the eigenvalue -1. For the composite system
we introduce the pure quantum states ρrs = (ψr ⊗ ψs)(ψr ⊗ ψs)∗.
Now we define the operators A = Qx ⊗ 1l, A′ = Qy ⊗ 1l, B =
1l⊗Qx and B′ = 1l⊗Qy. Let the initial state of the system λ be
chosen according to the measure IPρzz . A measurement of any of
the (pseudo) observables A,A′, B, B′ will yield the result 1. Now we
stipulate that a measurement of A or B doesn’t change the state,
but a measurement of A′ or B′ does cause it to change to a new
state λ′ selected according to the measure IPρyy . Then we find that
|E(AB) + E(AB′) + E(A′B) − E(A′B′)| = 4. It is not clear if such
an easy example is possible for a pair of spin- 1
2
particles, nor if it
is possible to obtain the same violation using a more natural time-
evolution. An other possibility for violating the Tsirelson bound may
be by also allowing probability measures other that the ones defined
in Theorem 2.3, i.e. measures that don’t obey the Born-rule.
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Obviously, there is a lot of terminology in this definition
which has to be defined before we can investigate it. How-
ever, a few notes of critique are already at place. First of
all, this notion of non-contextuality isn’t really a general
notion that applies to all operational theories, but rather,
it is a notion that is defined for all operational theories
but that may have a different meaning for different oper-
ational theories. Indeed, the precise notion of operational
equivalence can only be defined within the theory. It is
therefore not a metaphysical notion but a rather technical
one.
This brings us to a second point. If one confines oneself
only to quantum mechanics, the definition only applies to
ontological models that can be related to the operational
approach of quantum mechanics. We believe the oper-
ational approach is clouded by the instrumentalist phi-
losophy, and it can be taken as one of the aims of con-
structing hidden variable models to get rid of this phi-
losophy. To elaborate, in [38] an operational theory is a
theory in which preparations, transformations and mea-
surement procedures are the elementary concepts, and we
see no need why these concepts should play a role in a
hidden variable model per se. Of course there is still the
question of empirical equivalence between the operational
approach and the hidden variable approach, but in our
opinion this doesn’t imply that it should be possible that
all operational concepts can be translated in the language
of the hidden variable approach. In contrast, the notion of
outcomes of measurements of observables associated with
self-adjoint operators (upon which NC is based), is one
that clearly is necessary in any approach to quantum me-
chanics.
Let us introduce the necessary terminology. In an oper-
ational theory, an experimental procedure is described by
a preparation P , a transformation T and a measurement
M . When all three components are specified, they give
rise to a probability measure IP[ . |P, T,M ] on the set of
possible outcomes for the experiment. Two preparations
P and P ′ are equivalent iff IP[ . |P, T,M ] = IP[ . |P ′, T,M ]
for all T and M . Similarly, two transformations T and
T ′ are equivalent iff IP[ . |P, T,M ] = IP[ . |P, T ′,M ] for
all P and M and two measurements are equivalent iff
IP[ . |P, T,M ] = IP[ . |P, T,M ′] for all P and T . Two
experimental procedures are (operationally) equivalent if
their preparation, transformation and measurement are
equivalent.
A representation of an (operationally defined) experi-
mental procedure in the ontological model consists of a
representation of the preparation, the transformation and
the measurement. Because the experimental procedure is
described by three components, one can also split the no-
tion of non-contextuality in three components. That is,
an ontological model is called preparation non-contextual
if operationally equivalent preparations have equivalent
representations in the ontological model. Similarly, one
can define transformation non-contextuality and measure-
ment non-contextuality. Thus an ontological model is non-
contextual iff it is preparation non-contextual, transforma-
tion non-contextual and measurement non-contextual.
3.2 Preparation non-contextuality
A representation of the preparation P is a probability mea-
sure IPP on the set of ontological states Λ. Thus a prepara-
tion P prepares the system in the ontological state λ with
a probability according to this measure IPP . Two repre-
sentations IPP and IP′P are equivalent iff they are equal.
So an ontological model is preparation non-contextual if
every representation of a preparation P is completely spec-
ified by the equivalence class of preparations to which P
belongs. In short,
∀T,M IP[ . |P, T,M ] = IP[ . |P ′, T,M ] => IPP = IPP ′ .
(19)
In quantum mechanics every equivalence class of prepara-
tions can be identified with a density operator ρ. So an
ontological model of quantum mechanics is preparation
non-contextual if every representation of a preparation is
of the form IPρ, where ρ is the density operator associ-
ated with the preparation in the operational approach to
quantum mechanics.
In the MKC-models probability measures are in fact
specified by the density operator rather than by some no-
tion of a preparation, and it therefore seems that these
models are trivially preparation non-contextual. On the
other hand, in [38] it was proven that every ontological
model must be preparation non-contextual. Since the
proof takes place in the setting of the Hilbert space C2,
an argument against it based on the finite precision argu-
ment isn’t possible. Technically, this is because every set
of orthonormal bases of C2 is totally incompatible, and
therefore every set of self-adjoint operators is a possible
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set of observables in an MKC-model. So the discrepancy
must be sought elsewhere.
It turns out that the MKC-models do not satisfy one
of the criteria every preparation non-contextual theory
should obey according to [38]: every convex combination
of preparation procedures must be represented within the
ontological model by a convex sum of the associated prob-
ability measures. Indeed, suppose ρ, ρ′ and ρ′′ are three
distinct density operators such that ρ = pρ′+(1−p)ρ′′ for
some p ∈ [0, 1], then, in general (in the MKC-models), one
does not have that IPρ = p IPρ′ +(1 − p) IPρ′′ . For exam-
ple, let P1 and P2 be two non-commuting one-dimensional
projections and set ρ = 12P1 +
1
2P2, then
IPρ[P1 = 1, P2 = 1] = Tr(ρP1)Tr(ρP2)
=
(
1
2
+
1
2
Tr(P1P2)
)2
,
(20)
which in general is not equal to
1
2
IPP1 [P1 = 1, P2 = 1] +
1
2
IPP2 [P1 = 1, P2 = 1] =
1
2
Tr(P1)Tr(P1P2) +
1
2
Tr(P2P1)Tr(P2) =
Tr(P1P2). (21)
This is despite the fact that
IPρ[A ∈ ∆] = p IPρ′ [A ∈ ∆] + (1 − p) IPρ′′ [A ∈ ∆],
∀A ∈ Obs,∆ ⊂ σ(A), (22)
which means that the two measures are empirically equiva-
lent for all quantum mechanical admissible measurements,
but not for subsets that do not correspond to possible
observations. Of course, this relies on the assumption
that observables corresponding to non-commuting oper-
ators are not jointly measurable. If one rejects this as-
sumption, the two measures IPρ and p IPρ′ +(1 − p) IPρ′′
are empirically distinguishable (e.g. by simultaneous mea-
surements of P1 and P2).
So, if one accepts this line of reasoning, the MKC-
models are preparation non-contextual. There are a few
questions relevant at this point. First, can a convex com-
bination of preparations be associated with a preparation?
To this question we answer in the same way as Spekkens
would: of course. If one can prepare a system in the state
ρ′ and in the state ρ′′ and one is able to produce a ran-
dom variable X that gives the value 0 with probability p
and the value 1 with probability 1 − p, one can let the
outcome of this experiment decide whether one prepares
the system in the state ρ′ (upon finding 0), or in the state
ρ′′ (upon finding 1). Then, for all possible measurements,
the system is prepared in such a way as if it were pre-
pared in the state ρ = pρ′+(1−p)ρ′′. The question then is
whether or not this preparation procedure is operationally
equivalent to a preparation in the state ρ. If one forgets
about the preparation procedure the answer would be yes
since in that case no future measurement can distinguish
between the two preparation procedures. However, there
is a clear physical difference, even operationally, because
one can distinguish by simply measuring the value of X .
On a more abstract level, we think that the equivalence
of two preparation procedures is only well defined if both
preparation procedures are entirely defined for the same
system under consideration. So if one wishes to study a
certain system, all possible preparation procedures must
be specified in terms of this system.
Even if one doesn’t accept this argument against the
proof of the preparation contextuality of quantum me-
chanics in [38], there is still the question of the harmfulness
of preparation contextuality. In our opinion, it isn’t that
weird that two physically distinct preparations would lead
to distinct preparations of the ontological state. The only
thing that is seemingly weird about the situation would be
that, once one forgets about the preparation, there may be
no possible measurement that recovers information about
the preparation. But we don’t think this is typically non-
classical; throwing away information may lead to the im-
possibility of retrieving that information even classically.
In fact, in section 4.4 we will show that preparation contex-
tuality, as it is understood in [38], also appears in classical
systems.
3.3 Transformation non-contextuality
Our discussion on the notion of transformation non-
contextuality would be quite similar and so we wish to
skip the most of it. However, there are some interest-
ing additional remarks to make. Spekkens requires that
every possible transformation T is represented by a tran-
sition matrix ΓT (λ, λ′) which would describe the proba-
bility of the transition from the ontic state λ′ to λ given
the transformation T . In the MKC-models no such object
was defined. Mostly because we felt no need for it, but
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also because we were a bit sloppy. Thus far, the hedgehog
interpretation is our only MKC-model candidate for this
discussion, since it is the only one with a time evolution.
Although we introduced the evolution of the state λ as
a stochastic process, the process hasn’t been completely
defined mathematically. Our only requirement was that
IP[λ(t) ∈ ∆] = IPρ(t)[∆], (23)
but IP wasn’t defined, and there is no unique way for doing
this. Formally, IP is a measure on the space ΛR and one
needs to define its value on every measurable subset. For
the investigation of transformation non-contextuality we
at least require to define the values for IP[λ(t) ∈ ∆, λ(t′) ∈
∆′], and they don’t follow uniquely from (23). The easiest
way to introduce such a measure is by assuming that λ(t)
and λ(t′) are stochastically independent whenever t 6= t′.
One then simply has that
IP[λ(t) ∈ ∆, λ(t′) ∈ ∆′] = IPρ(t)[∆] IPρ(t′)[∆′]. (24)
In other words, knowing the precise state λ at a certain
point in time doesn’t help one at all in making predictions
about the future state.
This discussion isn’t very illuminating on the subject of
transformation non-contextuality, but it does demonstrate
that the assumption that transition matrices ΓT should
be defined in an ontological model isn’t a very trivial as-
sumption. In fact, we are still not at the point where we
have defined such objects for the hedgehog interpretation.
That would involve a lot more mathematical discussion
that isn’t interesting for the present discussion. For now,
we have shown that any transformation in the hedgehog
interpretation is completely specified by the transforma-
tion of the quantum mechanical state ρ. This sufficiently
shows that the hedgehog interpretation is transformation
non-contextual if one accepts that equivalence classes of
transformations can be specified by operators acting on
the quantum mechanical state.
However, in [38] it is also claimed that every ontological
model must be transformation contextual. The puzzling
assumption in the proof of this claim is similar to the one
we criticized for preparation non-contextuality. Namely,
it is assumed that convex combinations of transformations
are represented by convex combinations of transition ma-
trices. This assumption gives rise to the same discussion
that was given for preparations.
3.4 Measurement non-contextuality
Finally, we consider the notion of measurement non-
contextuality. A representation of a measurement M in
an ontological model is a function fM , which assigns to
each λ ∈ Λ a probability distribution on the set of pos-
sible outcomes for the experiment. In the MKC-models,
every measurement is taken to be the measurement of an
observable A which is described quantum mechanically by
the projection valued measure (PVM) µA. The function
fA simply assigns to each λ the value λ(A) which denotes
the outcome of the measurement. In this sense, the MKC-
models are deterministic (in [38] this is called ‘outcome
determinism’). Because in this sense two measurements
are operationally equivalent iff they are associated with
the same observable, the MKC-models are measurement
non-contextual.
Of course, in [38] a proof is presented that shows the ne-
cessity of measurement contextuality for every ontological
model. Although it requires that the ontological model
also describes positive operator valued measures (POVM),
this is not where our main concern lies. In fact, MKC-
models that also incorporate POVM’s may also be de-
fined (c.f. [18], [5]). No, our problem is that again auxil-
iary systems and measurements thereupon are introduced,
and then one forgets about this procedure in the descrip-
tion of the measurement process once the result has been
obtained. Indeed, although the probability distributions
over the possible outcomes of measurements are the same
in both systems, it is our opinion that the measurement
of the spin along some axis of a spin- 12 particle prepared
in the state ρ = 12 1l isn’t operationally equivalent to the
flipping of a fair coin and pretending the result came from
a measurement on the spin- 12 particle (whereas Spekkens
claims that it is).
All in all we believe that the notions of contextuality de-
fined in [38] rely too much on the operational approach as
is made clearer by our discussion. We have also seen that
the notion of ‘operational equivalence’ can become quite
ambiguous when discussing ontological models. The oper-
ational notions of non-contextuality are also not that inter-
esting metaphysically; they require that physically distinct
situations, which by some bending of definitions become
operationally equivalent, must have indistinct representa-
tions in ontological models. It is this strong and unsat-
isfying feature that allows Spekkens to proudly construct
proofs in a Hilbert space of dimension two, and claiming
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that therefore they are “stronger than traditional proofs of
contextuality”, which can only be constructed in Hilbert
spaces of dimension three and higher. It is clear that in
this case the stronger result relies on much stronger as-
sumptions.
4 Experimental tests for contextu-
ality
4.1 Introduction
The Kochen-Specker Theorem and Bell’s inequalities
probably are the most celebrated results in the founda-
tions of quantum mechanics of the past fifty years. While
the latter has been the subject for experimental tests for
over thirty years, the discussion on experimental tests for
the Kochen-Specker Theorem had to wait for a boost until
the turn of the century (e.g. [6], [12], [13], [19], [22], [24],
[25], [28], [32], [33], [34], [35], [37], [39]). In accordance
with the general idea that the Kochen-Specker Theorem
excludes non-contextual hidden variable theories, these ex-
perimental tests are also often referred to as experimental
tests of contextuality.
In principle, we are suspicious of the idea of an experi-
mental test of contextuality. In our opinion, a test to prove
contextuality would require a simultaneous measurement
of a single observable in two different measuring contexts.
These measuring contexts need not even be incompati-
ble in the quantum-mechanical sense. The paradox is of
course that, if the two measurements are distinguishable,
one cannot maintain the idea that the observable is the
same in both experiments, whereas, if they are indistin-
guishable, there is only one measurement of one observable
and not two. Roughly, this is why we believe that exper-
imental tests of contextuality are impossible, but a more
careful investigation is still required, which we will provide
in the remainder of this article.
The mentioned paradox would supposedly be circum-
vented by deriving statistical laws that are to be true in
every non-contextual hidden variable theory, but violated
in experiment and by quantum mechanics. However, the
derivation of every of these laws require more than the as-
sumption of Re, FM and NC; our minimal assumptions for
a non-contextual hidden variable theory. Although these
laws come in a huge variety, they basically make the same
implicit auxiliary assumptions. One of the more famous
[12] is based on a proof of the Kochen-Specker Theorem
known as the Mermin-Peres square for two spin- 12 particles
(e.g. [30]):
A11 = σx ⊗ 1l A12 = 1l⊗σx A13 = σx ⊗ σx
A21 = 1l⊗σy A22 = σy ⊗ 1l A23 = σy ⊗ σy
A31 = σx ⊗ σy A32 = σy ⊗ σx A33 = σz ⊗ σz
Here σx, σy and σz denote the Pauli spin matrices for a
single spin- 12 particle, and 1l is the unit operator on C
2.
Every row and every column in this square consists of three
commuting operators, which, according to quantum me-
chanics, can be measured simultaneously. One can there-
fore introduce the quantum observables Rk = Ak1Ak2Ak3
and Ck = A1kA2kA3k, which are identified with measuring
the three operators in the specified row/column simultane-
ously and then taking their product. Quantum mechanics
predicts that the result of a measurement of Aij equals
±1, and the result of Rk and Ck is always 1, except for
C3, which will be -1. However, one cannot assign values to
all Aij independent of them appearing in a row or column
such that all these rules are satisfied. In other words, the
assignment of definite values to these operators requires
the introduction of contextuality (in the sense of NC).
This result is of course not experimentally testable since
one cannot measure any Aij simultaneously both in the
context of the row in which it appears and the column in
which it appears to check if the values are identical because
the experimental contexts are mutually exclusive. But one
can derive (cf. [12]) the following statistical inequality for
all possible non-contextual value assignments to all Aij :
E(R1)+E(R2)+E(R3)+E(C1)+E(C2)−E(C3) ≤ 4, (25)
whereas quantum mechanics predicts the value 6 for the
left-hand side for all possible states of the system.
It is somewhat astonishing that so many authors be-
lieve that because (25) is an experimentally testable in-
equality even if the experiments only have a finite preci-
sion (and we agree with this), it somehow annihilates the
finite-precision argument against contextuality. However,
the finite-precision argument still holds, and it rules out
the derivation of (25) on the same grounds as that it ruled
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out the old argument based on the Mermin-Peres square:
one does not have to accept that all the operators appear-
ing in the square correspond to observables. In fact, by
the construction of Theorem 2.2, if A11, A12 and A13 are
identified with observables, all the other Aij are pseudo
observables, and so are R2, R3, C1, C2 and C3. Indeed,
the starting assumption of the entire derivation of (25) is
a weakened version of IP (c.f. section 2.2) that is rejected
in the MKC-models.
4.2 The behavior of MKC-models in ex-
perimental tests of contextuality
It is of interest to see how the MKC-models can man-
age to violate (25). It is also non-trivial; the fact that
the derivation of (25) uses assumptions that aren’t true
in these models, doesn’t imply that these models can ac-
tually violate (25). For this we distinguish two possible
ways of testing (25).
First we consider single measurements carried out on
systems that are part of an ensemble of systems prepared
in the same quantum state ρ. That is, on each system in
the ensemble only one measurement is performed corre-
sponding to either a row or column in the Mermin-Peres
square.6 In every MKC-model, each of these systems is
in a state λ selected according to the measure IPρ. Then,
by Theorem 2.3, one will find the value 1 for each of the
expectation values in (25) with exception of the last term,
for which one will find the value -1, resulting in a violation
of the inequality.
Next, consider the situation where the inequality is
tested by performing subsequent measurements on the
same system. One may follow the same line of reasoning
and come to the conclusion that (25) is still violated. How-
ever, this test also provides a way to discriminate between
several MKC-models. For example, if a measurement of
R1 is followed by a measurement of C1, not every MKC-
model predicts that the value obtained for the (possibly
pseudo) observable A11 will be the same in both mea-
surements. Obtaining different values would of course not
prove contextuality; in the MKC-model the actual observ-
able measured is not the same one in both experiments.
But it does show a discrepancy with quantum mechanics
6By a single measurement on a row/column, we mean a simul-
taneous measurement of all the observables in the row/column and
then taking the product of the obtained values.
which predicts that the obtained value for A11 will be the
same in both situations. Of course, the hedgehog inter-
pretation of section 2.4 is one of the exceptions since in
that model the evolution of the state λ is changed by the
first measurement in such a way that the obtained value
for A11 is the same in both measurements.
If one turns the argument around one again recognizes
the flexibility of the MKC-models; even if experimental
tests with subsequent measurements would disprove quan-
tum mechanics and the hedgehog interpretation (e.g. one
does find varying values for A11), there is still an MKC-
model with a time evolution that conforms with these mea-
surements.
It should be noted that for the Mermin-Peres square an
other non-contextual model that is not of the MKC-type
has been proposed by La Cour in [27]. This model does
satisfy NC and IP for the nine observables in the square
but it can work because it exploits a specific loophole in
the proof of the Kochen-Specker Theorem. QM together
with Re and FM requires that when observables with some
functional relationship are being measured, the measure-
ment results obey the same functional relations. However,
this doesn’t imply that the values possessed by these ob-
servables should obey these relations at all times. And
there are many ways to assign values to all observables if
one doesn’t require these functional relationships between
observables. La Cour exploits this loophole by stipulating
that before a measurement the measurement apparatus
interacts with the system in such a way that the values
of the observables that can be measured are altered such
that they do obey the required functional relationships.
Of course this can be seen as a violation of FM since the
measurement result obtained is not the value possessed
by the observable when the measurement process is ini-
tiated, but the value after the process has occurred. It
remains to be investigated if such a scheme can be gener-
alized such that one can construct non-contextual hidden
variable models for all possible quantum systems.
Meanwhile, it should be clear that the MKC-models can
violate other proposed inequalities for non-contextuality
(like the one proposed in [25]) that are similar to (25) (in
a sense as explained in [15]), in the same manner as de-
scribed above. Consequently, the result in [14] which is
a critique on the original model of Meyer doesn’t apply
to the more advanced MKC-models. In fact, the model
of Meyer –where one only considers squared spin observ-
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ables along an axis specified by unit vectors with rational
components– isn’t an MKC-model in the sense of how we
defined them here. Specifically, the notion of total incom-
patibility, which requires that each observable can only
appear in one measurement context (c.f. section 2.3), isn’t
satisfied in Meyer’s model.
4.3 Non-locality and ‘existential contex-
tuality’
Most of the recent articles on contextuality pay minor to
no attention to the finite precision argument. The recent
[13] is an exception, and it is claimed in that paper that
the finite-precision ‘loophole’ can be closed. Astonishingly,
this is done by introducing a locality argument. Indeed,
one now considers measurements on spatially separated
particles and they argue that
“[s]patial separation provides a physical basis to
the assumption that both measurements [on the
spatially separated particles] are not only ap-
proximately but perfectly compatible.” [13]
In light of the Mermin-Peres square, they argue that one
may assume that A11 is an observable and that both A12
and A21 can be observables. Something denied in the
MKC-models, where by assuming that A11 is an observ-
able it follows that at least one of A12 and A21 is a pseudo
observable. Cabello and Cunha prohibit this conclusion
based on spatial separation between the particles. How-
ever, this is not an argument that is valid in a non-local
theory. Indeed, in the MKC-model of the two-particle
system almost none of the observables coincide with self-
adjoint operators of the form 1l⊗A or A⊗1l (the supposed
‘local’ observables). Indeed, by the finite precision argu-
ment, the measurement of the observableA11 is most likely
to reveal the value of some non-local observable. So what-
ever experimental test is proposed in [13], it is more likely
a test of locality than of contextuality.
Closely related to this discussion is a peculiar feature
of the MKC-models first noted by Appleby in [3]. If one
considers a single particle, the observables that apply to
this system do not coincide with the set of observables one
ascribes to the particle if it is considered as a part of a sys-
tem of multiple particles. From this Appleby concluded
that the MKC-models exhibit a new form of contextual-
ity, namely, existential contextuality; the existence of an
observable depends on the context in which the system is
viewed (i.e. a single particle system, or a multiple particle
system). To the presented problem the advocate of the
MKC-models may respond in two possible ways.
First, as the MKC-models are non-local, one may argue
that from that point of view no isolated systems exist.
The description provided for the single particle is merely
an approximation, and the real observables are those that
apply to the whole of all particles, i.e. every actual observ-
able is extremely non-local. Secondly, one may argue that
the observables ascribed to single particle systems are the
real observables. Then, to prevent empirical discrepancies,
one is required to assume that simultaneous measurements
on separate particles are impossible; one of the measure-
ments occurs first and then causes an instantaneous state
change for the other particle. Note that this is an actual
modification of the MKC-models, and a violation of (25)
is obtained in an other way.
4.4 Experimental tests for operational
contextuality
In [38] suspicion of the possibility of experimental tests for
operational contextuality was still an issue because
“finite precision might imply that in practice no
two experimental procedures are found to be op-
erationally equivalent, in which case the assump-
tion of noncontextuality is never applicable.”
This is indeed a very practical objection and we should
note that it doesn’t apply specifically in the context of the
MKC-models (being based on an other finite precision ar-
gument) but applies in general due to the technical notion
of operational equivalence. Although this is a very strong
idea, it is waved aside on the basis of a vaguely stated
continuity criterion in [39], where an experimental test
for operational contextuality is proposed and performed.
More specifically, it is shown that there is an upper bound
to the success rate for a certain information theoretic task
that holds for any operational theory that admits a prepa-
ration non-contextual hidden variable model, but that is
violated by quantum mechanics. We will not criticize the
proof on basis of the experimental difficulties, nor does
an appeal to the MKC-models work in this case; surely
they can perform the task as good as quantum mechan-
ics, but they may be seen to be preparation contextual if
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one accepts the ambiguous way it is used in [38] and [39].
Instead, we will find a more basic objection.
The information theoretic task has the following setup.
Alice is given a pair of bits (a1, a2) uniformly at random
and Bob is given a number b ∈ {1, 2} uniformly at ran-
dom. Bob’s task is to construct a number X on the basis
of the information available to him such that IP[X = ab] is
maximal, i.e. determining supX IP[X = ab].
7 If there’s no
information available to him, he might as well flip a coin
for deciding X since in that case supX IP[X = ab] =
1
2 .
On the other extreme end, if Alice is allowed to commu-
nicate any information to Bob, Bob can always determine
ab correctly and simply takes X = ab, i.e., in that case
supX IP[X = ab] = 1. So the interesting cases are those
where there is some restriction on the information Alice
can send to Bob. The restriction introduced in [39] is that
Alice can send any information as long as it doesn’t con-
tain any information about the parity of her two bits (i.e.
the information must be parity-oblivious). That is, on
basis of the information Bob receives he can make no bet-
ter guess about the number a1+ a2 mod 2 than he could
without the information. For example, it is allowed that
Alice communicates only the value of a1 to Bob, since this
provides no information about the parity of (a1, a2). In
that case, if b = 1, Bob can predict ab with certainty, but
if b = 2 he may only guess ab correctly with a probability
of 12 . So for this setup we find IP[X = ab] =
3
4 . It is shown
in [39] that for information that is classically encoded (i.e.
in the form of a string of classical bits) this is also the
best strategy. That is, given the restriction of parity-
obliviousness, one has supX IP[X = ab] =
3
4 . Moreover,
it is shown that for any form of information-processing
that is described by an operational theory that admits
a preparation non-contextual hidden variable model this
is the upper bound of success. It is then shown that in
quantum mechanics and in practice one can do better,
proving that quantum mechanics and nature are prepara-
tion contextual. We will now repeat the violation of this
boundary by quantum mechanics as shown in [39] and
then construct a classical hidden variable model8 that re-
produces this success rate, and show that with the use of
7In [39] one considers the more general case where Alice is given
n bits and Bob is given a number at random from the set {1, . . . , n}.
For our discussion, the case n = 2 is rich enough to cover our objec-
tions.
8By ‘classical’ we mean classical in the sense that the model is in
accordance with Newtonian physics.
hidden variables one can do even better. Together with
the results in [39] this then shows that classical physics is
preparation contextual.
For a given pair of bits, (a1, a2), Alice prepares a system
according to some procedure Pa1a2 . And given a number
b ∈ {1, 2} Bob performs a measurementMb on the system.
Then, Bob processes the measurement outcome according
to some rule to obtain his guess X for the value of ab. In
the quantum mechanical case the preparation Pa1a2 used
by Spekkens et. al. consists of preparing a single qubit in
the state ρa1a2 where
ρ00 =
1
2
(
1 12
√
2(1− i)
1
2
√
2(1 + i) 1
)
,
ρ01 =
1
2
(
1 12
√
2(1 + i)
1
2
√
2(1− i) 1
)
,
ρ10 =
1
2
(
1 − 12
√
2(1 + i)
− 12
√
2(1− i) 1
)
,
ρ11 =
1
2
(
1 − 12
√
2(1 − i)
− 12
√
2(1 + i) 1
)
.
(26)
From the equality ρ00 + ρ11 = ρ10 + ρ01 it follows that
no measurement on the qubit can reveal any information
about the parity of (a1, a2) (c.f. [39]).
Now Bob’s strategy is the following. If Bob has b = 1
he measures σx and guesses a1 = 0 if he finds the re-
sult 1, and guesses a1 = 1 if he finds the value -1. It is
then a straight forward calculation to show that for b = 1
IP[X = ab] =
1
2 +
1
4
√
2. Similarly, if b = 2 Bob measures
σy and a similar process leads to the same success rate so
IP[X = ab] =
1
2 +
1
4
√
2 for every b, which is a higher suc-
cess rate then the maximal one with only communicating a
string of classical bits. We will now construct a classical in-
formation processing procedure that reproduces these suc-
cess rates, but violates the parity-obliviousness. Then we
make an adjustment to recover parity-obliviousness while
maintaining the same success rates.
Suppose instead of a qubit, Alice sends two classical bits
(λ1, λ2) whose values are chosen at random according to
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the probability measures IPa1a2 :
λ1λ2 00 01 10 11
IP00
3
8 +
1
4
√
2 18
1
8
3
8 − 14
√
2
IP01
1
8
3
8 +
1
4
√
2 38 − 14
√
2 18
IP10
1
8
3
8 − 14
√
2 38 +
1
4
√
2 18
IP11
3
8 − 14
√
2 18
1
8
3
8 +
1
4
√
2
(27)
In this example Bob takes for X the value of λb as a guess
for the value of ab. We then find for all (a1, a2) and b that
IP[X = ab] =
1
2 +
1
4
√
2 which is precisely the result we had
in the quantum case. However, in this case the information
send by Alice is no longer parity-oblivious since if Bob
takes the value λ1 + λ2 mod 2 as a guess for the value of
the parity, he has a success rate of
IP[λ1 + λ2 = a1 + a2 mod 2] =
3
4 >
1
2 . (28)
To re-obtain parity-obliviousness, instead of just send-
ing the information (λ1, λ2), Alice wraps up this informa-
tion in a system in a special way. Each of the values λ1 and
λ2 are written on separate pieces of paper. These pieces
are put in a box with two separate, closed compartments;
the value of λ1 stored in compartment 1 and the value
of λ2 in compartment 2. This box is then send to Bob.
However, the box is booby-trapped: upon opening either
compartment, the paper in the other compartment will be
incinerated. So Bob is only allowed to either obtain the
value λ1 or λ2, but not both. His guess for ab is still as
good as it is in the quantum case, but he can no longer
obtain any information about the parity of (a1, a2).
It may be clear that with the use of the box, this is
no longer the best strategy for guessing the value of ab.
Indeed, if Alice just stores the values of a1 and a2 in the
box in stead of λ1 and λ2, Bob can guess ab with certainty
while maintaining parity-obliviousness. So in the classical
case with use of the box we have supX IP[X = ab] = 1
which is higher than the upper bound for the quantum
case.
The incineration-box gives us an insight into the no-
tion of preparation non-contextuality and its connection
to parity-obliviousness. If one accepts the preparations
in (27) as the only possible preparations, one trivially
has that the model is preparation non-contextual because
none of the preparations are operationally equivalent. If
one also admits other preparations –in the form of convex
combinations– preparation contextuality reappears. For
example, the preparations
λ1λ2 00 01 10 11
IP0
3
8
1
8
1
8
3
8
IP1
1
8
3
8
3
8
1
8
(29)
are operationally equivalent, yet give different probabili-
ties for the hidden variables (λ1, λ2). Then if the booby-
trap is removed one is also able to measure both λ1 and λ2
and preparation non-contextuality is again obeyed. How-
ever, the additional possible measurements also nullify the
parity-obliviousness. So preparation non-contextuality
and parity-obliviousness are strongly linked and both rely
on the total of all admissible preparations and measure-
ments. In fact, this shows the dependence of the meaning
of preparation non-contextuality on the used theoretical
framework, for it is only within the framework that the
sets of all admissible preparations and measurements are
defined.
The quantum mechanical case can be viewed quite sim-
ilar: parity-obliviousness is only maintained by the as-
sumption that direct measurements of the state of the
system ρa1a2 are impossible. If one was able to deter-
mine the state in a single measurement, preparation non-
contextuality would be obtained and parity-obliviousness
would no longer be satisfied. However, the most impor-
tant lesson to be learned is that preparation contextuality
is not a typical quantum phenomenon; it can also appear
in reasonable classical systems for which a restriction on
the possible measurements exist. So although it may play
a significant role in information theory (due to its link with
parity-obliviousness), it has no significance in the discus-
sion on the foundations of quantum mechanics.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
We have explained and shown that there can be no exper-
imental test of non-contextuality (NC) under the assump-
tion of Re and FM. We state these additional assumptions
explicitly since without them the whole discussion would
be trivial. For example, in the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion (rejecting Re and FM) NC can be taken as an axiom
for the probabilities that the Born-rule assigns to possi-
ble measurement outcomes for an observable only depend
on the self-adjoint operator with which the observable is
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associated. This raises the question of the physical rele-
vance of the experimental tests. Rather then seeing the
tests as an indication for one of the assumptions to be
false, they may also be interpreted as proof for one of the
assumptions, namely, QM. Indeed, the experimental tests
reveal explicitly how the functional relationships between
observables is respected by the measurement outcomes,
suggesting that such observables are strongly correlated.9
Consequently, the tests also give us more insight into what
part of the Hilbert space structure is essential for the de-
scription of certain phenomena.
The advocates of experimental tests of contextuality
may of course still argue that our definition of non-
contextuality is too artificial, and that the tests may ex-
clude some other form of non-contextuality. Although the
operational notion of non-contextuality was partly intro-
duced to generalize definitions like NC to a less artificial
level, we have seen that quite the opposite appears to be
the case. The operational approach introduces new ambi-
guities with respect to operational equivalence and notions
of non-contextuality that are so strong that even classical
systems are deemed to be non-classical.
We still agree that NC is an artificial criterion, but we
think that any notion of non-contextuality that is more
satisfying is even less likely to be the subject of empirical
investigations. The definition of NC depends strongly on
the formulation of orthodox quantum mechanics and thus
doesn’t make much sense in arbitrary theories. One may
therefore propose an other definition:
NC’ The outcome of a measurement is independent of
which other measurements are performed simultane-
ously.
It is clean of any reference to quantum mechanics and
also doesn’t include a clause on the compatibility of mea-
surements, as is sometimes seen. In orthodox quantum
mechanics and the hedgehog interpretation this criterion
is satisfied since the Born rule assigns probabilities inde-
pendent of what measurements are being performed (c.f.
[20, §5.2], [30, §VII]).
The discussion becomes more interesting if one also as-
sumes Re and FM, since one then infers that the value
of a measured observable is independent of which other
observables are being measured. This is still true in the
9Of course, the experimental tests of non-locality may be taken
to also show this.
hedgehog interpretation, although one does have that the
actual observable being measured may depend on which
other observables are being measured. For example, in
terms of the Mermin-Peres square, if one wishes to mea-
sure the (pseudo) observable A11 simultaneously with A12,
the actual observable being measured differs from the one
measured if one measures it simultaneously with A21. One
may interpret this as yet an other form of contextuality.
Our response to this view reveals one of the main problems
with contextuality. This form of ‘contextuality’, that the
MKC-models possess, is quite reasonable since one cannot
expect in general that in different experimental setups one
is able to measure the same observables. This provides an
argument for any theory to escape the label of being con-
textual; if one observable has different values in several
measuring contexts, apparently it isn’t the same observ-
able in these different contexts, and one simply introduces
extra observables to obtain non-contextuality. So any the-
ory can be made non-contextual (in the sense of NC’) by
introducing sufficiently many new observables.
All in all, it seems that non-contextuality can only be
defined in a satisfactory way within the framework of a
theory (like our definition NC for quantum mechanics),
reducing the metaphysical relevance of any statement con-
cerning such a notion of non-contextuality. We therefore
claim that although contextuality (if well specified) can
be used to compare theories for which it is well-defined,
any theory-independent definition of non-contextuality is
either ambiguous, or trivially satisfiable by any theory. It
therefore seems a concept that is unlikely to play an un-
ambiguous role on the metaphysical level of the study of
nature, which seems the attempt of some of the authors
of the experimental tests of contextuality. Or, to put this
conclusion more bluntly: there is no experimental meta-
physics with respect to contextuality.
On a positive note, we do believe that experimental
metaphysics with respect to non-locality may well be pos-
sible. The reason for this is that whereas the notion of
non-contextuality is quite counterfactual in nature (lead-
ing to the paradox we discussed in section 4.1), this isn’t
the case for non-locality. Of course it remains to be proven
that the finite-precision argument doesn’t cause a problem
for the derivation of Bell-inequalities and other results that
attempt to show the necessity of non-locality. We aim to
provide these proofs in a future article.
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